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TRADE IN NATURAL GAS: THE CHANGING
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
ROBERT C. PLATT*
SYNOPSIS
Natural gas trade between the United States and Canada is grow-
ing at a time when both countries are shifting from direct regulation of
utilities to an increased reliance on market forces. Recent decisions by
United States courts, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC or the "Commission"), and the Economic Regulatory Adminis-
tration (ERA) have attempted to create a level playing field between
domestic and imported natural gas. In addition, the United States-Ca-
nada Free-Trade Agreement will affect future natural gas trade be-
tween the two nations.
1. INTRODUCTION
The natural gas industry is one of the most highly regulated in-
dustries in both the United States and Canada. Each nation has taken
its own approach to regulating both the commodity itself and the utili-
ties that handle it. However, both nations are moving toward substitut-
ing competitive forces for direct regulation. Also, the natural gas trade
between the United States and Canada has become enmeshed in the
broader bilateral negotiations and implementation of the United States-
Canada Free Trade Agreement.' These changes in the natural gas in-
dustry have resulted in a number of unfair trade claims. Hence, the
natural gas industry may be the setting for an important first test of the
viability of the Free Trade Agreement.
The United States has grown increasingly dependent on Canadian
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The Free-Trade Agreement is not officially published as a treaty. The official
text was printed as an appendix to H.R. Doc. No. 216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)
(containing the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, the Proposed U.S.-Ca-
nada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, and a Statement of Adminis-
trative Action). The Agreement has been unoffically reprinted as The United States-
Canada Free-Trade Agreement, done Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281
[hereinafter FTA].
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gas imports. In 1968, for example, the United States imported only 652
Bcf. This volume grew to 1,283 Bcf in 1988.
Unlike unregulated commodities that sell at a stated price, natural
gas is frequently sold under contracts that specify two separate rates. A
commodity charge represents the price per unit of natural gas sold dur-
ing a period of time. In addition, a demand charge is assessed each
month for the right to purchase a specified maximum quantity of gas.
As a result of this pricing structure in such a heavily regulated indus-
try, it is possible for imported natural gas to be competitive, through
regulatory benefits, even if the commodity is more expensive on a unit
price basis than available domestic supplies. In view of this regulatory
context, trade concepts such as "dumping" must be reexamined.
2. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: TYPES OF AUTHORIZATIONS
2.1. Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act
Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act2 is the primary statutory author-
ity for regulation of both the movement of gas across the United States
border and the sale of gas over the border. Section 3 requires prior
government approval for all imports or exports of natural gas.' The
natural gas industry thus enjoys legislation that would be the envy of
the most protectionist advocate of any other industry.
2.1.1. Public Interest Test
Section 3 prescribes a "public interest" standard.' That standard
has recently been transformed. Traditionally, the public interest test
was viewed as substantially equivalent to the "public convenience and
necessity" standard prescribed by Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act.5
The test traditionally required an examination of the border price, the
need for gas, the security of supply, the effect on the U.S. balance of
payments, the effect on domestic supplies, and other factors.6 Antitrust
policy was also a consideration in applying the public interest test.1
More recently, the public interest test has been redefined to focus
2 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of June 21, 1938, ch. 556, §
3, 52 Stat. 822).
3 15 U.S.C. § 717b (1988).
4 Id.
5 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1988). See Distrigas Corp. v. FPC, 495 F.2d 1057, 1065
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974) (judicial legitimation of the tradi-
tional view).
6 West Virginia Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Dep't of Energy, 681 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
" California Gas Producers Ass'n v. FPC, 421 F.2d 422, 428 (9th Cir. 1970).
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on the existence of "competition" without consideration of specific
prices, contract terms, balance of payments, or effect on domestic
supplies.8
2.1.2. Entities Holding Authorizations
Section 3 is drafted to require that a specific "person" hold au-
thorization and, traditionally, this was the person taking title to the
imported gas at the border." More recently, the Economic Regulatory
Administration has permitted agents of undisclosed principals to hold
the Section 3 authorizations without the agents ever taking title to the
imported gas.10
2.1.3. Agency Action
The ERA may either grant, deny, or impose conditions on any
application for authorization. In addition, Section 3 confers on the
ERA the right to impose additional conditions at any time "after op-
portunity for hearing.""1 However, recent cases hold that a trial-type
hearing "is required only when it would tend to enhance the accuracy
of the decision making; that is, only for determinations of adjudicative
facts.""2
2.2. Executive Order No. 820213
Executive Order No. 8202, as amended,' 4 requires a presidential
permit to construct and operate natural gas border facilities. The Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission is authorized to issue permits after
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. 5
2.3. Sections 4, 5, and 7 of the Natural Gas Act
Sections 4, 5, and 7 of the Natural Gas Act provide for the regula-
tion of all gas movement from the border and into the United States, as
8 See infra Part 3.
9 See 18 C.F.R. §§ 153.1, 153.6(a) (1989).
10 ANR Pipeline Co., 1 E.R.A. 70,748, at 72,818 (1988).
11 15 U.S.C. § 717b (1988).
2 New England Fuel Inst. v. ERA, 875 F.2d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Inde-
pendent Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. ERA, 870 F.2d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 1989); Panhan-
dle Producers & Royalty Owners v. ERA, 847 F.2d 1168, 1178 (5th Cir. 1988).
IS Exec. Order No. 8202, 3 C.F.R. 560 (1938-1943), superseded by Exec. Order
No. 12038, 3 C.F.R. 136 (1979), Exec. Order No. 10485, 3 C.F.R. 66 (1974).
14 Id.
15 See 18 C.F.R. §§ 153.10-.12 (1989) (application procedures). See also Exec.
Orders Nos. 12038, 10485, supra note 13.
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well as of sales for resale in interstate commerce. 6 The Natural Gas
Act defines interstate commerce to exclude foreign commerce.17 Hence,
subsequent movement of gas from the international border is not within
the jurisdiction of the Natural Gas Act if the imported stream is not
commingled with an interstate stream and does not travel outside the
state of importation.' 8
These provisions allow FERC to exercise plenary power of regu-
lation over interstate pipelines, including the right to review the pru-
dence of management decisions after the fact.' The goal of the Natural
Gas Act, including its regulation of imports as well as of downstream
sales and transportation is "to afford consumers a complete, permanent
and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges."20
3. DIVISION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN FERC AND ERA
3.1. DOE Organization Act
Prior to October 1977, all authority under the Natural Gas Act
was vested in the Federal Power Commission (FPC). The Department
of Energy Organization Act2' (DOE Act) transferred responsibility for
gas imports and exports from the FPC to the Secretary of Energy. The
statute vested authority over Section 4, 5, and 7 matters in FERC.22
However, this assignment was qualified: "No function described in this
section which regulates the exports or imports of natural gas or electric-
ity shall be within the jurisdiction of the Commission unless the Secre-
tary assigns such a function to the Commission."23 There is no clear
line which separates regulation of imported gas versus regulation of its
downstream disposition. Proponents of ERA jurisdiction argue that
regulation of imports should extend to the burnertip consumption of the
imported gas. Proponents of FERC jurisdiction would draw the line at
the international border crossing.
Although the DOE Act assigned import and export matters to the
Secretary, he or she is allowed to delegate to other DOE units and has
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d, 717f (1988).
17 15 U.S.C. § 717a(7) (1988).
18 Border Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 171 F.2d 149 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
19 E.g., Office of Consumers Counsel v. FERC, 783 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
But see TransCanada PipeLines Ltd. v. FERC, 878 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
20 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 360 U.S. 378, 388
(1959).
21 Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 567 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter DOE Act].
22 DOE Act §§ 402(a)(1)(C)-(D), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7172(a)(1)(C)-(D) (1982 &
Supp. V 1987).
23 DOE Act § 402(0, 42 U.S.C. § 7172(0 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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delegated various import matters to FERC24 and the ERA.2 5 The Sec-
retary's "delegation orders" have finessed the Section 402(f) contro-
versy2 '6 by delegating Sections 4, 5, and 7 to FERC on the assumption
that there might be some powers excluded from the congressional dele-
gation to FERC by Section 401 (f.21
Even if the Secretary had not cured this ambiguity by delegation,
Congress also provided for the statutory supremacy of FERC in any
dispute over responsibilities. Section 404(a) of the DOE Act provides:
[W]henever the Secretary proposes to prescribe rules, regula-
tions, and statements of policy to general applicability in the
exercise of any function which is transferred to the Secretary
under sections 301 or 306 of this Act, he shall notify the
Commission of the proposed action. If the Commission, in its
discretion, determines within in such period as the Secretary
may prescribe, that the proposed action may significantly af-
fect any function within the jurisdiction of the Commission
• . . the Secretary shall immediately refer the matter to the
Commission, which shall provide an opportunity for public
comment ... 28
3.2. Prior to 1984
From 1977 to 1984, FERC regulated imports related to the
Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System,29 designated cases which
were pending at the FPC,30 handled siting of import facilities and had
"residual authority" on issues not addressed by the ERA."1 In most
cases, an importer had to apply for Section 3 authorizations from both
the ERA and FERC. In addition, the project participants would file
under Sections 4 and 7 for approval of the downstream disposition of
the imported gas.32
24 DOE Act § 402(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7172(e) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
25 DOE Act § 642, 42 U.S.C. § 7252 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
28 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
27 Deleg. Order No. 0204-112, § (b), 49 Fed. Reg. 6,684 (Dep't Energy 1984).
28 42 U.S.C. § 7174(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
29 Deleg. Order No. 0204-8, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,491 (Dep't Energy 1977). The
Alaskan Natural Gas Transportation System is regulated under the Alaskan Natural
Gas Transportation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 718 (1988).
O 10 C.F.R. § 1000.1 (1988); Deleg. Order No. 0204-1, § 11, 42 Fed. Reg.
55,637 (Dep't Energy 1977).
31 Deleg. Order No. 0204-55, 44 Fed. Reg. 56,735 (Dep't Energy 1979).
12 See Huard, Regulation of the Importation and Exportation of Natural Gas: A
Survey and Analysis of Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 533
(1981).
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3.3. February 1984 Delegation
In an attempt to provide applicants with a one-forum authoriza-
tion, the Secretary in February 1984 assigned all Section 3 cases to
ERA.33 The only exception was that FERC retained jurisdiction over
the siting of border facilities.3 4 FERC continued to administer Sections
4, 5, and 7 with the condition that "FERC shall not issue any order,
authorization, or certificate unless such order, authorization, or certifi-
cate adopts such terms and conditions as are attached by the Adminis-
trator [of the ERA]. '" 5
As discussed below, the division of authority between ERA and
FERC continues to be controversial. The controversy in part reflects a
perception that the ERA has sought to facilitate the importation of Ca-
nadian gas, while FERC is generally perceived to be concerned with
maintaining equal competitive opportunities between domestic and Ca-
nadian natural gas.
Dissatisfaction with the ERA-FERC division has resulted in the
introduction of legislation to amend the DOE Act to reassign Section 3
exclusively to FERC."6 On February 7, 1989, the Secretary of Energy
removed the responsibility for natural gas imports and exports from the
ERA and transferred them to the Assistant Secretary for Fossil Fuels."
This transfer does not resolve the ambiguity in the division of regula-
tory responsibility.
3.4. Purchasing Practices
The key issue in the division of responsibility between the ERA
and FERC is which agency reviews the prudence of the importing
pipeline's gas purchasing practices. Prior to wellhead price decontrols
under the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA)3 8 virtually all gas supplies
purchased by interstate pipelines were subject to direct regulation.
Hence, customer challenges to purchasing practices were limited to se-
lecting high-priced supplies39 or failing to contract for sufficient sup-
plies.4" After the enactment of the NGPA and the significant increase
U Deleg. Order No. 0204-111, 49 Fed. Reg. 6,684 (Dep't Energy 1984).
3' Deleg. Order No. 0204-112, § (a), 49 Fed. Reg. 6,684 (Dep't Energy 1984).
35 Id. § (c).
36 S. 1973, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S18,420-21 (1987).
'7 Deleg. Order No. 0204-127, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,436 (Dep't Energy 1989), Energy
Management (CCH) 1 70,051 (Feb. 7, 1989).
"I Pub. L. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3352 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432
(1988)) [hereinafter NGPA].
" Metzenbaum v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 4 F.E.R.C. 61,277, reh'g
denied, 5 F.E.R.C. % 61,095 (1978).
40 Virginia v. Tenneco, Inc., 538 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976); Monsanto Co. v.
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in gas prices from 1979 to 1982, customers actively challenged pipeline
gas purchasing practices, even in the face of a statutory guarantee of
pass-through of wellhead gas costs.41
Domestic gas producers claim that imported gas receives several
regulatory advantages that encourage pipelines to purchase imports
when less expensive domestic supplies are available. First, unlike do-
mestic wellhead purchases, the purchase of Canadian gas is not subject
to scrutiny by either FERC or the ERA. Exporter and pipeline can
agree to a division of markets in a border contract. For example, in
Northwest Pipeline Co. the pipeline entered into a contract that guar-
anteed forty-five percent of Northwest's sales market to a particular
Canadian supplier, regardless of the availability of lower-priced domes-
tic gas. When Northwest's customers challenged the contract, FERC
held that ERA approval of the import precluded FERO from examin-
ing the prudence of Northwest's purchasing practices regarding the Ca-
nadian supplies.4 FERC assumed that ERA would provide a forum
for challenging the prudence of such transactions. However, ERA has
construed the Section 3 public interest standard so narrowly as to pre-
vent such inquiries:
The public interest inquiry into the competitiveness of an
import, and the resulting presumption of need if an import is
found to be competitive, focuses on whether the negotiated
arrangement, taken as a whole, provides the importer with
the ability to compete in the marketplace, and with the flexi-
bility to respond to market changes and thereby enhance
competitive pressure on market participants. It does not fo-
cus on the competitive effect of an arrangement upon domes-
tic producers, or on whether the gas can be supplied more
economically by domestic or other suppliers in a particular
instance."
In addition, because the ERA had previously approved the Northwest
contract when it covered prices as high as $4.94 per MMBtu, ERA
took the position that no further authorization is required to impose a
FPC, 463 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Texasgulf, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.,
610 F. Supp. 1329 (D.D.C. 1985).
41 NGPA § 601(c), 15 U.S.C. § 3431(c) (1988). See also Office of Consumers
Counsel v. FERC, 783 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
42 Northwest Pipeline Co., 39 F.E.R.C. 61,215, reh'g denied, 41 F.E.R.C. T
61,022 (1987), affd sub nom. TransCanada PipeLines Ltd. v. FERC, 878 F.2d 401
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
43 Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 1 E.R.A. T 70,744, at 72,801 (1987), affd
sub nom. Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. ERA, 870 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1989).
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forty-five percent market share guarantee as long as the price of the gas
under the amendment does not exceed $4.94.44 Thus, absent a clarifica-
tion from the agencies or a court decision, parties are without a forum
to challenge the prudence of gas purchasing practices under the current
interpretation of each agency's jurisdiction.
Recent cases hold that the prudence of an import transaction can
be challenged, if at all, only at the ERA. In TransCanada PipeLines
Ltd. v. FERC, the court considered a challenge by a customer of an
importing pipeline to the prudence of the pipeline's purchasing prac-
tices.4 In essence, the customer claimed that the pipeline's mix of gas
supplies included excessive amounts of expensive imports. The court
held, "For FERC to take a second look at the arrangement between
pipeline and exporter and decide whether the pipeline did in fact ar-
range reasonably prudent terms would be to say that the Commission
may reevaluate either ERA's factual determinations or its policy. This
however, is what FERC is specifically prohibited from doing."4 Al-
though FERC has made an important distinction between a prudence
review of a pipeline's gas supply mix and the regulation of the terms of
specific purchases, TransCanada did not acknowledge this distinction.
Another recent case also held that FERC, when approving a Sec-
tion 7 certificate to authorize transportation of imported gas, may "in-
dependently examine any effects claimed to be due to the specific trans-
portation proposal, as opposed to effects inherent in the importation
and sale of gas in the United States as a whole."'4 7 However, this op-
portunity may have little practical effect, as imported natural gas can
be transported under self-implementing authorizations without case-
specific review.48
3.5. Downstream Section 4 Rate Treatment
The second dispute between the authority of FERC and the ERA
centers upon whether the ERA can bind FERC when FERC sets pipe-
line rates for the resale of the imported gas downstream from the bor-
der. For example, in Northwest Pipeline Corp.,49 the exporter and
Northwest, the importing pipeline, agreed in a border contract to "as
billed" rate treatment in downstream rates. Northwest sought declara-
"' Northwest Pipeline Co., 1 E.R.A. 1 70,604, at 72,428 (1985).
45 878 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
46 878 F.2d at 407.
4' ANR Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 876 F.2d 124, 132, reh'g denied, 885 F.2d 937
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
41 See 18 C.F.R. pt. 284 (1989).
49 1 E.R.A. % 70,604, reh'g denied, 1 E.R.A. iT 70,609 (1985).
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tory orders from both FERC and the ERA approving the two-part rate
instituted by the newly amended contract. The parties asked the ERA
to approve the border contract and to declare its determination binding
upon FERC in subsequent Section 4 proceedings.
The ERA approved the border contract and expressly found:
[O]nly the ERA Administrator may review international
contracts and authorize imports. Once the Administrator has
approved an import arrangement, the FERC, while exercis-
ing its Section 4 and 5 authorities, cannot act in a manner
inconsistent with the actions taken by the Administrator.
Thus, it could not significantly alter or overturn the arrange-
ments upon which the Administrator's actions are based.'
Further, the ERA found that "the as-billed flow-through provision" of
the contract is "an integral part of the arrangement.""1 Later, the ERA
qualified its position by noting that the division of costs between de-
mand and commodity charges is "within the FERC's jurisdiction in an
exercise of its authority under Sections 4 and 5 of the NGA to approve
these specific elements while acting in a manner consistent with the
ERA's decisions and the DOE's policies. Clearly, if there are compo-
nents of a demand charge, such as production-related costs that FERC
would not normally permit to be treated as fixed costs, the Canadian
import should be treated no differently." 52 FERC followed this sugges-
tion and rejected "as billed" flow-through costs in Natural Gas Pipe-
line Co. of America (Opinion No. 256), 53 where it required the import-
ing pipeline to recover certain amounts paid in Canadian demand
charges in its own commodity rates. The ERA has acquiesced in this
requirement, although the ERA has declined to impose the same re-
quirement on two-part rates charged to distributors or end-users whose
imports are not subject to a downstream FERC rate proceeding.54
50 1 E.R.A. 1 70,604, at 72,430.
Is 1 E.R.A. 5 70,609, at 72,445.
52 Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. 1 E.R.A. 1 70,645, at 72,533 (1986).
3 37 F.E.R.C. % 61,215 (1986), reh'g denied, 39 F.E.R.C. 1 61,218, affd sub
nom. TransCanada PipeLines Ltd. v. FERO, 878 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1989) [herein-
after Opinion No. 2561.
" Minnegasco, Inc., 1 E.R.A. % 70,721, at 72,731, reh'g denied, 1 E.R.A. 1
70,738 (1987), affd sub nom. Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. ERA, 886 F.2d
1338 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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4. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
4.1. February 1984 Policy Guidelines
In February 1984 the Secretary of Energy issued policy guidelines
for ERA consideration of Section 3 applications. 55 Under the guide-
lines, an applicant must demonstrate that its proposed importation will
be competitively priced. If competitive pricing is shown, the guidelines
create a rebuttable presumption that the gas is needed. The guidelines
contemplated that the ERA would continue its case-by-case review of
Section 3 applications and strongly recommended that the parties to
existing long-term arrangements renegotiate to add market-responsive
pricing terms.56
The guidelines appear to place the burden of proof in demonstrat-
ing that an import transaction is competitive on the applicant: "The
importer will be required to demonstrate that the provisions in the pro-
posed import arrangement, collectively, ensure that the gas will be com-
petitive."5 However, in practice, the ERA has placed the burden of
proof on the intervenors challenging an import.58
Domestic producers have argued that the guidelines were not
properly promulgated because the Secretary did not refer the guidelines
to the Commission pursuant to DOE Act Section 404."9 The Fifth Cir-
cuit, however, in Panhandle Producers and Royalty Owners Associa-
tion v. ERA, held that private parties do not have standing to challenge
DOE actions on the failure to comply with Section 404."0 Thus, the
guidelines will remain in effect until the Secretary issues superseding
provisions.
Although the court in Panhandle Producers denied standing to
those challenging the guidelines, the decision limited the substantive ef-
fect of the guidelines in individual proceedings. The court held that the
conclusions resulting from application of the guidelines are to be "sub-
ject to complete attack" before they are applied in particular cases.6
" New Policy Guidelines and Delegation Orders from the Secretary of Energy to
Economic Regulatory Administration and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Re-
lating to the Regulation of Imported Natural Gas, 49 Fed. Reg. 6,684 (1984).
5' 49 Fed. Reg. at 6,687.
57 49 Fed. Reg. at 6,688. Accord Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 1 E.R.A.
70,634, at 72,502 (1986).
"8 See, e.g., Northridge Petroleum Marketing U.S., Inc., 1 E.R.A. 1 70,610, at
72,447, affd sub nom. Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v. ERA, 822
F.2d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
59 42 U.S.C. § 7174(a) (1982).
6o 847 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (5th Cir. 1988).
61 847 F.2d at 1175. See also Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v.
ERA, 822 F.2d 1105, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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4.2. Blanket Import Authorizations
Traditionally, an import authorization would specify a seller/ex-
porter and a purchaser/importer. Since 1985, however, the ERA has
authorized imports on a "blanket" basis, without prior knowledge of
the specific transactions proposed. The ERA has granted over 109
blanket authorizations covering the importation of over 17 Tcf of Cana-
dian gas. 2 Applicants receive a "hunting license" for any U.S. market,
even without disclosing specific prices or markets. Because the details of
specific transactions are not at issue in a proceeding to grant a blanket
certificate, the ERA generally approves such applications as a matter of
policy, on the assumption that competition from domestic supplies will
prevent gas which is priced above the market rate from being
imported. 3
Producers have sought to limit the blanket import authorizations
only to those markets served by open access pipelines. The ERA re-
jected this restriction in Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co."' The only condi-
tion that the ERA imposes on blanket authorizations is to limit them to
two years from the date of first deliveries. The ERA approves all re-
quested volumes, even though the total volumes far exceed existing
pipeline capacity. Extensions beyond the initial two-year term are
granted routinely."
4.3. Regulation after the Border
4.3.1. The "As Billed" Controversy
In response to the 1984 guidelines, Canadians restructured border
contracts, substituting two-part rates for take-and-pay clauses. These
rates have the effect of shifting costs from the commodity charge col-
lected at the border to the demand charge. The Canadians hoped that
by offering a lower commodity charge, Canadian gas would gain better
access to U.S. markets, even though the total unit price for gas was
higher than competing supplies. This situation would work particularly
well in the competitive California market because the Canadian Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC) sequences supplies in southern Califor-
62 See Brief for Appellant, Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. ERA, 870
F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-4047).
83 Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v. ERA, 822 F.2d at 1113.
64 1 E.R.A. % 70,764 (1986), reh'g denied, 1 E.R.A. 70,684 (1987), affd sub
nom. Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v. ERA, 847 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir.
1988).
6" See, e.g., Salmon Resources, Ltd., 1 E.R.A. 1 70,749 (1988); Poco Petroleum,
Inc., 1 E.R.A. 70,752 (1988).
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nia were based on commodity charges alone.
The market advantage of two-part rates depends upon the ability
of downstream pipelines to separate costs in their rates "as they were
billed" by the suppliers. In its Opinion No. 256,6 the Commission re-
jected an "as billed" approach and instead required the costs to be reas-
signed to the commodity rate based upon FERC-approved rate-making
principles.
In response to that ruling, the Canadians have attempted to estab-
lish two-part rates on the so-called NOVA system67 and to reclassify
plants from gathering to transmission. In addition, a group of North-
east distributors, who had previously aggregated supplies in the United
States with subsequent jurisdictional resales, restructured their opera-
tion. By aggregating supplies north of the border, each distributor
would hold its own import authorization and purchase the gas under
ERA-approved rates without being required to apply FERC Opinion
No. 256.
4.3.2. First Sale Treatment of Marketer Sales
NGPA Section 601(a)(1)18 removes certain first sales from the
scope of the Natural Gas Act. Because sales of domestic gas by market-
ers are first sales, these marketers are not subject to the Natural Gas
Act. 9 Domestic producers, however, contend that when a marketer re-
sells Canadian gas in the United States, that sale is not entitled to "first
sale" treatment. The FERC has resolved this issue by asserting Natu-
ral Gas Act jurisdiction over the sales and granting blanket certificates
prospectively. FERC has not addressed the status of sales for resale by
marketers of Canadian gas made prior to the certificates.7
FERC has the authority to declare any sale for resale of natural
gas to be a first sale if regulation of the sale is necessary to prevent
circumvention of ceiling prices under Title I of the NGPA.71 Certain
Canadian importers have sought first sale treatment of imported natu-
ral gas as necessary to avoid circumvention of ceiling prices. However,
the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989 provides for the
" 37 F.E.R.C. 1 61,215 (1986), reh'g denied, 39 F.E.R.C. 61,218, affd sub
nom. TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. v. F.E.R.C., 878 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
67 See 39 F.E.R.C. 61,218, at 61,769 (1987).
68 15 U.S.C. § 3431(a)(1) (1982).
" Inquiry into Alleged Anticompetitive Practices Relating to Marketing Affiliates
of Interstate Pipelines (Order No. 497), 53 Fed. Reg. 22,139 (1988); FERC Stat. &
Regs. T 30,820 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 161, 250, 284).
70 Salmon Resources, Ltd., 50 F.E.R.C. 61,101 (1990).
7' 15 U.S.C. § 3301(21)(A)(v) (1988).
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phasing out of remaining Title I regulation by 1993.2 This new statute
and the large portion of first sales which are currently decontrolled cast
doubt on the viability of the circumvention rationale.
4.3.3. Agency Imports
A "person" must hold a Section 3 authorization; this statutory re-
quirement applies to both case-specific and blanket import authoriza-
tions. A recent trend is to "sublease" the blanket import authorizations
so that the holder of the authorization is merely the agent for the per-
son who takes title to the gas. This creates a regulatory gap. 3 Some
parties have argued that this practice creates a loophole in FERC's
prohibition against brokering interstate pipeline capacity. 74 FERC pro-
posals on capacity brokering, however, could affect this policy.
75
4.3.4. Marketing Affiliates
The Commission has prescribed certain standards of conduct for
the unregulated marketing affiliates of interstate pipelines . 7  Unregu-
lated marketing affiliates of Canadian pipelines raise the same potential
for abuse as do those of domestic pipelines. The marketing affiliates of
Canadian pipelines, however, do not appear to be covered by FERC's
rulings for marketing affiliates unless they are also affiliates of United
States pipelines.77
4.4. The United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement
The Free-Trade Agreement resulted from a long process. On Sep-
tember 26, 1985, Prime Minister Mulroney formally requested that
Canada and the United States examine the potential for negotiating a
Free-Trade Agreement. On December 10, 1985, President Reagan no-
tified the Congress of his intent to enter into bilateral negotiations with
Canada using the "fast track" procedures under the Trade Act of
1974.78 The negotiations took place between June 17, 1986 and De-
72 Pub. L. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157, 157-58 (1989) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
3301).
7' The ERA has not attempted to assert jurisdiction over either the principal or
the agency relationship.
See ANR Pipeline Co., 43 F.E.R.C. 1 61,014 (1988).
7 See Brokering of Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Capacity, 53 Fed. Reg.
15,061 (1988) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 284.281-.283) (proposed Apr. 24, 1988).
76 See sources cited supra note 69.
77 See Standards of Conduct for Interstate Pipelines with Marketing Affiliates, 18
C.F.R. § 161.1 (1988).
78 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1982).
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cember 9, 1987. The final text of the FTA was signed on January 2,
1988. 9 On July 25, 1988, President Reagan transmitted this agree-
ment to Congress for approval, together with the proposed implement-
ing legislation and a Statement of Administrative Actions.8"
Several provisions of the FTA affect the natural gas industry.
Chapter 9, on energy, applies to "measures related to energy goods
originating in the territories of either party."8" A "measure" includes
"any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice. ' 82 The defi-
nition of "energy goods" includes natural gas.8"
Thus, the natural gas regulation consists of a series of energy mea-
sures which are subject to the FTA. Article 902(2) prohibits quantita-
tive restrictions on imports and exports, minimum export-price require-
ments and minimum import-price requirements.84  Under this
provision, past Canadian regulations which abrogated border contracts
and set the minimum export prices during the gas shortages of the mid-
1970s would not be permitted.88 In future shortages, any curtailment of
exports would have to be on a pro rata basis with domestic alloca-
tions.86 In general, the FTA attempts to treat imports on the same basis
as a national dealing with domestic supplies is treated. 87 The FTA's
"national treatment" obligation also extends to state regulation.88
Domestic producers have felt that the agreement may perpetuate
the existing trade distortions between the two countries. Congressional
debate regarding the impact of the FTA on natural gas centered
around these concerns.89
4.4.1. Effect on Existing Statutes and Regulations
The FTA does not take precedence over existing legislation. The
legislation implementing the FTA provides: "No provision of the
Agreement, nor the application of any such provision to any person or
19 See FTA, supra note 1.
1o S. REP. No. 509, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2395, 2398.
1 See FTA, supra note 1, art. 901.
82 Id. art. 201.
83 Id., Statement of Administrative Action at 48.
11 Id. art. 902(2).
85 See also id. art. 904(b), which prevents a minimum price from being used to set
an export price higher than the price charged for such energy good when consumed
domestically.
86 Id. art. 904(a).
87 Id. arts. 105, 902(a), Statement of Administrative Action at 48.
88 Id. art. 103, Statement of Administrative Action at 56. In theory, whenever a
state awards an exclusive franchise to a gas distributor, such action is subject to consul-
tation under FTA art. 2010(2).
89 See, e.g., 134 CONG. R~c. S12,986-01 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1988).
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circumstance, which is in conflict with any law of the United States
shall have effect." 90 Thus, the provisions of the Natural Gas Act
prohibiting discrimination continue to apply equally to domestic and
imported gas. At the very most, the FTA holds the promise for im-
ported gas to receive the same treatment as gas produced or sold by a
national. Further, the Statement of Administrative Actions purports to
be an exhaustive list of the regulatory changes necessary to implement
the FTA. 1 The Statement does not include any regulatory actions re-
garding natural gas.
4.4.2. Grandfathering the "As Billed" Decision
Shortly after the FTA was signed, the Canadian government sug-
gested that FERC Opinion No. 2562 was an example of the type of
energy action that would be subject to second-guessing by the bina-
tional dispute resolution mechanism. 9 3 However, the Canadian Ambas-
sador and the Administration took the position that Opinion No. 256
was not affected by the FTA.94
4.4.3. Binational Dispute Resolution Mechanism
It does not appear that other "energy actions," such as FERC rate
decisions, will be second-guessed by the three binational mechanisms
established under the FTA. First, Article 905 of the FTA establishes
an informal consultative mechanism between the United States Depart-
ment of Energy and the Canadian Department of Energy, Mines and
Resources regarding "energy regulatory actions."95 FERC and the Na-
tional Energy Board (NEB) of Canada are not necessarily part of this
mechanism. Nor are FERC's ex parte rules96 waived in such consulta-
tions, in the event that FERC elects to participate.9 7 Furthermore, any
90 United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-449, § 102(a), 102 Stat. 1851 (1989). See also FTA, supra note 1,
Statement of Administrative Action at 55.
91 H.R. Doc. No. 216, supra note 1, Statement of Administrative Action at 1.
92 Natural Gas Pipelines Co. of Am., 37 F.E.R.C. 1 61,215 (1986), reh'g denied,
39 F.E.R.C. 61,218, affd sub nom. TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. v. F.E.R.C., 878
F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
'3 See DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CANADA, THE CANADA-U.S.
FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT 142 (1988); Testimony of C. Geoffrey Edge, former Chair-
man, National Energy Board of Canada (FERC 1989) (No. RP87-62).
9" See S. REP. No. 509, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 62-63 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2395, 2457-58. See also H.R. Doc. No. 216,
supra note 1, Statement of Administrative Action at 56.
9 FTA, supra note 1, art. 905.
96 18 C.F.R. § 385.2201 (1988).
" See H.R. Doc. No. 216, supra note 1, Statement of Administrative Action at
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results of a consultation would not be binding on FERC.98 Second, the
binational dispute resolution mechanism of FTA Chapter 19 does not
replace the judicial review provisions of Section 19 of the Natural Gas
Act. 9 Hence, complaints regarding a regulatory action would not be
subject to direct review under the FTA. Third, FTA Chapter 18 pro-
vides for consultation and ultimately arbitration of trade disputes before
the new Canada-United States Trade Commission (CUSTC).' 00 Again,
the CUSTC does not have the power to review or set aside FERC
actions directly. The CUSTC, however, can award compensation to the
complaining nation. 0 1 Finally, either party can request the CUSTC to
provide an opinion regarding an interpretation of the FTA for use in a
regulatory agency proceeding." 2 Thus, the FTA, as approved, will not
have as direct an effect on regulation of natural gas as some parties
advocated prior to its consideration by the Congress.
In general, the FTA addresses discrimination by the exporting na-
tion where the discrimination harms the importer. It does not remedy
discriminatory practices against a domestic industry within the import-
ing country. Thus, the primary forum for assuring that the Canadian
gas industry will compete on a fair basis with the domestic gas industry
continues to be FERC and the Department of Energy. However, trade
concepts remain in place under the FTA which conceivably could pro-
vide relief to the domestic gas industry. For example, to the extent that
commodity rates are the prime contract provision determining success
in the gas markets, a border contract incorporating a below-cost com-
modity rate could form the basis for an anti-dumping action." 3
4.5. New Pipelines from Canada
Despite the regulatory incentives for importing Canadian gas, a
primary obstacle to the volume of short-term imports is the availability
of pipeline capacity connecting Canadian producing regions with U.S.
markets. FERC has proposed that significant new capacity be added to
bring Canadian gas to the Northeast 0 and California markets.
57.
98 DOE Act § 401(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7171(d) (1982) (FERC is not responsible to
the DOE).
15 U.S.C. § 717r (1982).
100 FTA, supra note 1, arts. 1804-1806.
101 See H.R. Doc. No. 216, supra note 1, Statement of Administrative Action at
93.
102 See FTA, supra note 1, art. 1808.
10 See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673i (1988).
104 Northeast U.S. Pipeline Projects, Order Ruling on Discreteness of Additional
Northeast Projects and Establishing Procedures, 46 F.E.R.C. 61,012, reh'g denied,
47 F.E.R.C. 61,172 (1989) [hereinafter Northeast Order].
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With respect to the Northeast, the importers have arranged for
local distribution companies and end-users' 0 5 to take title to the gas at
the border. Because there will be no sale for resale within the Commis-
sion's Section 4 jurisdiction, the applicants expect to avoid the applica-
tion of Opinion No. 256 to the two-part border price structure. In re-
sponse, domestic producers and a competing domestic pipeline have
argued before FERC that the transportation on the new pipelines
should be conditioned upon a rate structure consistent with Opinion
No. 256.106 Further, the Commission has relied upon the FTA to avoid
addressing allegations regarding excessive dependence on Canadian
gas.
10 7
Parties opposing the construction of new facilities also face a diffi-
cult burden in Section 3 proceedings. In Michigan Consolidated Gas
Co. v. ERA,'08 an industrial end-user sought to bypass its gas distribu-
tion company by constructing a pipeline under the Detroit River to
connect to Canadian supplies. The distributor opposed the Section 3
application of the end-user, arguing that the bypass would shift costs
onto the other customers of the distributor. 0 9 The court held that the
distributor was not injured by the authorization of the bypass and
lacked standing to challenge ERA's order."0
Several parties have proposed construction of extensive new pipe-
line facilities from Alberta and British Columbia to California.' If
FERC approves a reasonable portion of the Northeast and California
proposals and the pipelines are constructed, pipeline capacity between
the UnitedStates and Canada could easily double by 1993. Once bor-
der capacity is no longer constrained, the California and Northeast
markets would compete for Canadian supplies based upon the wellhead
price each market can offer. Given this competitive environment, the
financing and transportation rate structures of the proposed pipeline
facilities may be the first in the history of the natural gas industry to be
shaped by a combination of the new trade relationship between the
United States and Canada and competitive concerns. With billions of
dollars of proposed investments at stake, it is vital that these permanent
investment decisions not be distorted by short-term regulatory
105 E.g., Ocean State Power, I E.R.A. % 70,810 (1988); Brooklyn Union Gas Co.,
1 F.E. No. 86-44-NG (Dep't Energy Jan. 11, 1990).
106 See Northeast Order, 46 F.E.R.C. at 61,070-71.
107 Id.
108 889 F.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
109 Id. at 1111.
110 Id.
111 E.g., Pacific Gas Transmission Co., No. CP89-460 (FERC filed Dec. 20,
1988).
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advantages.
5. CONCLUSION
With the reassignment of Section 3 responsibilities from the ERA
and the implementation of the FTA, trade in natural gas between Ca-
nada and the United States is evolving into a new era. Ultimately, the
public will be best served if the Canadian gas industry and the domestic
gas industry are allowed to compete based upon price, without regula-
tory distortions. Whether that goal can be realized remains to be seen.
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